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OPINION OF THE COURT 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from an order for summary 
judgment entered in favor of the defendant-appellee Huntington National Bank 
("Huntington") on January 14, 2009, in this action that plaintiff-appellant Martik 
Brothers, Inc. ("Martik") brought against Huntington. See Martik Bros., Inc. v. 
Huntington Nat'l Bank, 2009 WL 89282 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14,2009) ("Martik"). The action 
arose from Kiebler Slippery Rock, LLC's ("Kiebler") development of a student housing 
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project ("Project") near Slippery Rock University in Slippery Rock Township, Butler 
County, Pennsylvania. Huntington financed the Project in accordance with a 
Construction Loan Agreement with Kiebler dated October 10, 2006, in which Huntington 
agreed to provide up to $29,521,368 for construction to be secured by two mortgages on 
the property on which Kiebler was constructing the Project. Martik was Kiebler's general 
contractor on the Project pursuant to two contracts it entered into with Kiebler on or about 
August 29, 2006. Though Huntington made its loan to Kiebler and not to Martik, it 
disbursed proceeds from the loan by wire transfer directly to Martik upon receipt of 
Martik's approved draws as work on the Project progressed.' 
During the course of the construction financial difficulties arose on the Project 
that resulted in Huntington not making payments on Martik's final draw in September 
2007. Consequently, Martik initiated arbitration proceedings against Kiebler in 
accordance with a standard arbitration provision in the construction contracts, and in 
those proceedings Martik obtained an arbitration award against Kiebler for 
$2,687,781.38, plus interest and costs to cover the shortfall.' Kiebler, however, is in 
lIn its briefMartik explains that "[t]he parties agreed that Martik would send [its] pay 
applications directly to Monica Butko, senior account relationship associate for 
Huntington, with copies of the pay applications to Richard Dexter, construction risk 
manager for Huntington, and Paul Kiebler." Appellant's br. at 5. As a matter of 
convenience we refer to the pay applications as "draws" as does Huntington in its brief. 
2Martik filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award in the Common Pleas Court of 
Washington County, Pennsylvania, but Kiebler removed the proceedings to the District 
Court. The parties in their briefs do not tell us the status of those proceedings. 
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bankruptcy and has not paid the award. Martik did not have a contract with Huntington 
and thus ordinarily Martik, as it recognizes, would not be able to look to Huntington for 
payment on its contracts with Kiebler even though Huntington had been making payments 
directly to Martik for its work on the Project. 
Nevertheless Martik believes that Huntington is liable to it for an amount equal to 
the arbitration award as a consequence of certain representations that Huntington made to 
Martik. In this regard it is undisputed for purposes of these summary judgment 
proceedings that Martik expressed its concerns about payment to Richard Dexter, a 
Huntington construction risk manager, on three occasions? The first of the occasions 
followed a meeting regarding the Project in June 2007 at which Kiebler, Martik and 
Huntington were represented. Prior to that meeting Huntington had for a number of 
months been aware of financial difficulties on the Project and the meeting was held to 
address that situation. Following the meeting, Frank Martik, Martik's representative at 
the meeting, asked Dexter who was present with another of Huntington's representatives, 
whether Martik would have anything to worry about with respect to payment to it. Dexter 
said "No. There's nothing to worry about." App. at 171. The other Huntington 
3Huntington does not contend that notice to Dexter was not notice to Huntington. 
Richard Dexter testified during his deposition that he did not recall the first two 
conversations though he does not deny that they took place. Notwithstanding Dexter's 
lack of memory, Huntington indicates that it "disputes the existence and contents of these 
communications, but for purposes of the appeal, [it] understands that the Court must 
consider the facts in the light most favorable to Martik ...." Appellee's br. at 4 n.1. 
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representative present did not contradict Dexter on this point. Notwithstanding Dexter's 
assurances to Frank Martik on the day ofthe meeting, Frank Martik obviously was 
uneasy, as it later turned out with good reason, for the next business day he called Dexter 
and again asked him if Kiebler had sufficient funds left in the loan to pay Martik for the 
remainder of the work under its contracts. Dexter answered "yes." 
Dexter's assurances, however, were misplaced because in September 2007, on the 
third occasion when Frank Martik asked Dexter about payment for Martik's work on the 
Project, at a time by which Martik substantially had finished its work but had not been 
paid on its final draw, Dexter told him that there were not sufficient funds to cover the 
draw. Frank Martik during his deposition indicated that ifDexter had told him in June 
that the funds were not sufficient to pay Martik it would have pulled off the job. Instead, 
Martik remained on the job, which now has been completed, and Martik thereby became 
entitled to substantial additional payments on its construction contracts as evidenced by 
the arbitration award." Significantly, notwithstanding Dexter's assurances to Frank 
Martik in June 2007, when Dexter told Frank Martik that there were sufficient funds to 
pay Martik, Dexter's contemporaneous internal Construction Monitoring Report showed 
that there was a shortfall of $1,077,000 dollars on the Project. Dexter, however, did not 
advise Frank Martik of the shortfall or of the report. 
4Martik asserts that in reliance on Dexter's representations it "continued to perform 
construction on the Project while incurring additional costs, which resulted in an 
outstanding unpaid contract balance of$2,120,003.75." Appellant's br. at 23-24. 
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By reason of its final draw on the Project not having been paid, Martik brought this 
action against Huntington advancing three theories in support of its claim with which we 
are concerned on this appeal. First, Martik contended that Huntington made 
misrepresentations regarding the availability of funding under the construction loan to pay 
Martik and the misrepresentations caused Martik to continue work on the Project and 
thereby become entitled to payments which have not been made. Second, Martik 
contended that it detrimentally relied on Huntington's promises and stayed on the Project 
and thus Huntington, by reason of a legal theory predicated on promissory estoppel, is 
liable for an amount equal to the arbitration award.' Third, Martik contended that 
Huntington was unjustly enriched at Martik's expense and therefore is liable to Martik," 
Martik, 2009 WL 89282, at *1. 
After completion of discovery, Huntington successfully moved for summary 
judgment against Martik. In its opinion granting that motion the District Court explained 
5We think that it would be incorrect to characterize Martik's damages claim as 
asserting that Huntington was liable for the arbitration award, inasmuch as the award 
included the amount for which Kiebler was liable under its construction contracts with 
Martik and, as we have explained, Huntington is not liable under the contracts. Rather, 
Martik is seeking to recover its losses from Huntington on the basis of a tort claim against 
Huntington. We express no opinion on what the effect will be on Martik's arbitration 
award if it makes a recovery against Huntington though we recognize that Huntington 
may seek to subordinate to the arbitration award to the extent, if any, that it makes 
payments to Martik. 
"Martik also alleged that it was a third party beneficiary of the Kiebler-Huntington 
Construction Loan Agreement, but the District Court rejected that theory. See Martik, 
2009 WL 89282, at *4-6. Martik does not advance this contention in this Court so we do 
not address it. 
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that the elements of the tort of intentional misrepresentation under the applicable 
Pennsylvania law are a misrepresentation which is material to the transaction at hand 
made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false; 
with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation; and a resulting injury being proximately caused by the reliance. 
Martik, 2009 WL 89282, at *6. See Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. 1999); Gibbs 
v. Ernst. 647 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1994). The District Court then set forth more completely 
than we have done the history of the events leading to this litigation including the two 
statements that Dexter made to Frank Martik in June 2007 regarding the availability of 
funding and the circumstance that Dexter by that time had concluded that there was a 
financial shortfall on the Project. 
The District Court concluded from the facts that: 
It is doubtful that Mr. Dexter's rather casual statements themselves or any 
other evidence adduced by Martik can support an inference that the 
representations were made falsely, with knowledge of their falsity or 
recklessness as to whether they were true or false, or that Martik would be 
justified in relying on such informal and non-specific conversations to 
assure it that there were sufficient funds to complete the project and pay 
Martik in full. [Huntington] offers evidence to support its contention that 
Mr. Dexter reasonably believed that there would be sufficient funding 
because, as Martik knew, Kiebler was looking for another source of 
funding, and that his statements were therefore true. 
Martik, 2009 WL 89282, at *7. The District Court then went on to explain that: 
But even if the Court found a genuine issue of material fact on these 
elements of the common law tort of intentional misrepresentation, Martik's 
claim must fail in the complete absence of any evidence that might 
7 
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reasonably support an inference that Dexter's statements were made with 
the intent ofmisleading Martik into relying on it and induce it to finish a 
project it otherwise would not have. In lieu of actual evidence of intent, 
Martik merely speculates that Dexter and [Huntington] must have intended 
to mislead and induce Martik's reliance, extrapolating such intent from the 
fact that they were aware of funding shortfalls before the statements were 
made. Interestingly, although Martik claims that Frank Martik 'would have 
pulled off and cut our losses' if Dexter's answer had been 'no,' Martik does 
not aver that it communicated that to [Huntington]. 
Id. 
After the District Court rejected Martik's misrepresentation claim," it held that 
Martik could not recover on a detrimental reliance theory which it indicated is the 
equivalent ofa claim predicated on promissory estoppel. Id. at 8. See Lehigh Valley 
Hosp. v. County ofMontgomery, 768 A.2d 1197,1200 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). In 
reaching this conclusion the District Court pointed out that Dexter merely said that there 
was adequate funding for the Project but that "Dexter's responses to Martik cannot be 
construed as a promise by [Huntington] to pay Martik for its work performed for Kiebler 
nor can it be deemed a guarantee or a loan commitment." Martik, 2009 WL 89282, at *8 
7Martik advances in this Court claims of both intentional and negligent 
misrepresentation. The District Court, however, addressed a claim of intentional 
misrepresentation but not negligent misrepresentation in granting summary judgment to 
Huntington, Martik, 2009 WL 89282, at *6-8, possibly because as Huntington contended 
in the District Court, Martik's complaint arguably did not state a claim for negligent 
misrepresentation. At this time, however, we need not decide whether Martik adequately 
pled negligent misrepresentation, though the District Court can consider that question on 
iremand if it necessary to do so. Of course, we do not preclude Martik from seeking on \th~ remand to ~mend its complaint to assert a claim predicated on negligent 
rmsrepresentation. 
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Though we do not agree with some aspects of the District Court's detrimental reliance 
discussion that we have not quoted, we do agree with the language we quote on this point 
and thus we will not reverse on the basis ofMartik's detrimental reliance theory or 
address that theory any further in this opinion. 
The District Court also rejected Martik's unjust enrichment claim which it 
explained was "a synonym for quantum meruit," Martik, 2009 WL 89282, at *9. See 
Mitchell v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1200, 1202 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). We agree with that 
disposition because the only thing of value that Huntington can be said to have received 
from Martik that could support a claim against it predicated on an unjust enrichment 
theory was the advantage to Huntington of having the Project completed thereby making 
its mortgage loans on the property more secure. But Martik does not contend on this 
appeal, and so far as we are aware did not contend in the District Court, that Huntington 
did not advance the funds that it agreed to supply when it entered into the Construction 
Loan Agreement with Kiebler and thus we are satisfied that Huntington has paid what it 
agreed to pay for the value ofMartik's performance under the construction contracts. 
Therefore Martik's unjust enrichment claim must fail. See Meyers Plumbing and Heating 
Supply Co. v. West End Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 498 A.2d 966,969 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1985). In any event, at oral argument in our Court Martik acknowledged that its unjust 
enrichment claim did not add anything to its misrepresentation claim. Thus, we do not 
address the unjust enrichment claim further. 
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Martik now appeals from the order ofJanuary 14,2009.8 The District Court had 
jurisdiction in this diversity of citizenship action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and we 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1291. We exercise plenary review on this 
appeal and thus we can affirm only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
Huntington is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. See Santos ex rel. Beato v. United 
States, 559 F.3d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).9 
Though we agree with the District Court's statement of Pennsylvania law setting 
forth the elements of the tort of intentional misrepresentation, we are satisfied that the 
Court should not have granted summary judgment to Huntington to the extent that the 
Court rejected that theory. We, however, supplement the Court's statement ofthe law by 
observing that Martik, in addition to asserting that Huntington intentionally 
misrepresented the facts, may have intended to contend that Huntington was guilty of 
negligent misrepresentation which, rather than requiring that the declarant actually know 
of the falsity of its statement, merely should have known of its falsity. See Bortz v. Noon, 
729 A.2d at 561. 
8The District Court also granted Huntington's uncontested motion for summary 
judgment for indemnification against third party defendant Kiebler for any judgment that 
Martik obtained against Huntington. We, however, are not concerned with the third party 
proceedings on this appeal and thus make no further reference to them. 
9It should be understood that our factual recitations with respect to the events in this 
case are only for purposes of this appeal from the grant of summary judgment. We do not 
suggest that we are binding the District Court or a jury on remand to any factual 
conclusion that we set forth now on the basis of the record before us. 
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In explaining the reasons for our conclusion we start off by pointing out that 
notwithstanding the District Court's characterization of Dexter's statements as "rather 
casual," we see nothing casual about Dexter's two June 2007 statements when they are 
considered together. Though it is true that Frank Martik's original inquiry of Dexter with 
respect to Martik being paid followed a more formal meeting and thus standing alone 
might be regarded as casual, there was nothing casual when he called Dexter the next day 
and again asked about the sufficiency of the funds to pay Martik. Arguably it should have 
been obvious to Dexter at that point that Martik had real concerns about getting paid and 
was, quite understandably, inquiring about being paid from the source of the funds being 
paid to it. In this regard we reiterate that Huntington had been disbursing proceeds from 
the construction loan directly to Martik so it was logical for Martik to ask Huntington 
about the availability of additional funds. 
Moreover, although we certainly do not preclude the trier of the fact on the remand 
that will follow this opinion from concluding that Dexter believed what he said about the 
availability of sufficient funding to pay Martik, clearly the evidence supports an inference 
that Dexter knew that his statements that there was sufficient funding were false or 
reckless, or at a bare minimum so doubtful that a jury could believe that he was negligent 
when he expressed them. In this regard we reiterate that at the same time that Dexter was 
making the statements assuring Frank Martik that the funds were available to pay Martik, 
Dexter had concluded that there was a shortfall of$I,077,000 on the Project, a conclusion 
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he memorialized in a contemporaneous internal Huntington report. Moreover, we reject 
the District Court's view that its grant of summary judgment was justified inasmuch as 
Dexter "reasonably believed that there would be sufficient funding" because "Kiebler was 
looking for another source of funding." Martik, 2009 WL 89282, at *7. After all, the 
record does not demonstrate that Dexter had any way of knowing if Kiebler would obtain 
that funding. In any event, arguably it should have been clear from the two conversations 
considered together that Frank Martik was not asking Dexter whether the funding to pay 
Martik would be there in the future. He was asking if it was there. 
In reaching our conclusion we have not overlooked the District Court's conclusion 
that it is doubtful that Martikjustifiably could rely on the "non-specific conversations" 
between Frank Martik and Dexter. Rather, we cannot understand what was not specific 
in Frank Martik's inquiries as to whether there was funding to pay Martik and Dexter's 
answers that the funding was there. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how Frank 
Martik's questions and Dexter's answers could have been more specific. 
We also reject the District Court's view that Martik's claim must fail because there 
was no evidence to support an inference that Dexter intended to mislead Martik and 
thereby induce it to finish the Project even though funds to pay it were not available. 
Quite to the contrary, we cannot help but wonder what the District Court thought Dexter 
believed would have happened ifhe had told Frank Martik that, as proved to be the case, 
there was not sufficient funding to pay Martik for its work, or ifhe said that he did not 
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know ifthere was sufficient funding for that purpose. Surely Dexter had to believe that if 
Martik doubted that it would be paid it would not complete the Project. 
We recognize that the District Court correctly points out that Frank Martik did not 
tell Dexter that Martik would pull off the job if the funding was not there, but Frank 
Martik had no reason to do so because Dexter said that the funding was there. 
Accordingly, though the District Court found that this point regarding Frank Martik not 
telling Dexter that without an assurance of payment Martik would leave the job was 
"interesting] ]," it is without significance because the evidence at least supports and 
probably compels that an inference be drawn that Dexter was trying to keep Martik on the 
job. How could the evidence not support that inference for surely, as Dexter was well 
aware, it was in Huntington's interest that Martik finish the Project and thereby enhance 
the value of Huntington's security? 
In its brief Huntington heavily relies on its contention that "Dexter's alleged 
representations regarding whether Kiebler has sufficient funds to pay Martik ... are 
expressions of opinion and not statements of existing fact." Appellee's br. at 11. On the 
basis of that contention any statement of fact can be repackaged as an opinion. 
Huntington was financing the Project and was closely monitoring the use ofthe funds it 
was advancing. Frank Martik asked Dexter point blank as the construction was nearing 
its conclusion whether Kiebler had sufficient funds to pay Martik, and Dexter gave an 
unequivocal answer of ''yes.'' Thus, Dexter did not hedge his answer in the slightest and 
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say, for example, '"I think so." If the bank financing the Project did not know the answer 
to Frank Martik's question then who would? On these summary judgment proceedings 
we must regard the record as supporting a conclusion that Martik had every right to 
regard Dexter's statements as setting forth a fact, not an opinion. Dexter's statements 
cannot be equated to a stock broker's opinion of what a security will be worth at some 
future date. Frank Martik was inquiring whether the funding was there, not whether 
Kiebler could raise the money to pay Martik. 
For the foregoing reasons the order of January 14,2009, will be reversed and the 
case will be remanded to the District Court so that Martik may proceed on its 
misrepresentation claim. 
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